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The Restatement of the principal subjects of the common law, which has been proceeding since 1923, is a task of equal magnitude and importance. If the multiplicity of
jurisdictions in the United States makes the work of more urgent necessity than a
similar undertaking in England, its progress has been viewed by English lawyers with a
mixture of admiration and envy. Few English lawyers would fail to welcome a competent analysis of the vexed subjects of the common law, even if no serious suggestion
exists of codification. The Restatement of the Law of Agency, published in 3933,
which might suitably be dedicated to the memory of Professor Floyd R. Mechem, provides, within a comparatively narrow compass, an example which English lawyers
would be happy to emulate.
It is clear that of a work which extends into two volumes and covers 1390 pages no
attempt can profitably be made to offer detailed criticism. The only practicable course
is to select certain passages as typical of the whole. The present reviewer hopes he will
be forgiven if he approaches his task from the point of view of English law and thus
offers the most obvious standard of comparison to assist the task of examination. In
this manner it is proposed to deal successively with the following subjects: (i) Ratification; (2) Undisclosed Principal; (3) Liability for Fraud; (4)Liability of Agents to
Third Parties.
(i)

RATIFICATION

The doctrine of ratification was thus stated by Chief Justice Tindal in Wilson v.
Tumman, 6 Man. & G., 236, 242 (c. p. 1843): "That an act done for another by a person, not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any
precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal, if subsequently ratified
by him, is the known and well-established rule of law. In that case the principal is
bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or for his advantage, and whether it
be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority." In the dog
Latin which lawyers affect, Omnis ratiltabitioretrotrahituret inandatopriori aequiparatur. Now the question immediately arises, if the ratification refers back to the time of
the formation of the original contract between the agent and the third party just as if
the agent were equipped ab initiowith conclusive authority, can the third party withdraw his offer in the interval between its acceptance by the agent and its affirmance by
the principal?
The question arose in the English Court of Appeal in 1889 in the case of Bolton
Partnersv.Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295 (1889). In that case the defendant had made an
offer of purchase to a certain Scratchley, who was agent to the plaintiff company, but
was not authorized to make any contract of sale. Scratchley accepted the offer on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendant subsequently withdrew his offer, whereupon the
plaintiffs ratified Scratchley's acceptance. The Court of Appeal held that the de-
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fendant's withdrawal was inoperative and that the plaintiffs were entitled to specific
performance. The decision, though apparently a logical deduction from the doctrine of
ratification, was severely criticised by Lord Justice Fry in his book on "Specific Performance" and was distinguished by Mr. justice Maugham in 193 1 in Watson v. Davies,
[Ig3rI] I Ch. 455. In the Bolton Case he said: "The decision of the court was founded
on the view that there was a contractual relation of some kind which could be turned
into a contract with the company by a ratification," while in Watson v. Davies the
agent had told the third party that he had no authority to accept his offer and there
was thus no contract which the principal could by ratification appropriate for his own
benefit. The decision in the Bolton Case, therefore, though its authority has not been
directly impugned, is recognized as a source of difficulty and as an injustice to the third
party in a complicated issue of facts. He may find himself bound by his offer while the
intended principal is free to accept or reject it as he pleases. In these circumstances
section 88 is of peculiar interest to the English lawyer." To constitute ratification, the
affirmance of a transaction must be before the third person has manifested his withdrawal from it either to the purported principal or to the agent, and before the offer or
agreement has otherwise terminated or been discharged." In other words, Lord Justice
Fry's strictures upon Bolton Partnersv. Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295 (1889), are justified and
the reasoning in this case rejected. The result, if it is not strictly logical, gratifies common-sense and would be received with pleasure by English lawyers.
(2)

UNDISCLOSED PrPAL

The anomalous doctrine of the undisclosed principal has long disturbed the harmony of Anglo-American law. It was introduced by Chief Justice Lee in the middle of
the eighteenth century in circumstances which still await adequate explanation, it
manifestly disregards the principle of privity of contract, and it has been attacked with
severity bordering on ferocity by such writers as Ames, as at once misleading and superfluous. In the face of all these disadvantages it obstinately retains its hold on the
law, and the draftsmen of the Restatement, no less than English judges, recognize that
it is too late to do more than regret its existence. One of the complicating factors in its
evolution has been the necessity of distinguishing two possible cases: where the existence as well as the identity of the principal remains undisclosed, and where the third
party realizes that he is in fact dealing with a principal, but is ignorant of his personality. In the former case the Restatement refers to the principal as "undisclosed" and
in the latter as "partially disclosed." The nomenclature is convenient and will be
adopted.
An important distinction between these two cases is brought out in the two English
cases of Armstrongv. Stokes, L.R. 7 Q.B. 598 (1872) and Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q.B.D., 102
(1879). In both cases the question to be decided was this: Suppose between the time
when the agent B made the contract with the third party C and the time when C discovers the principal to be A, A has paid or otherwise settled with B. How does this
affect the rights of C? On the one hand, is A to pay twice over? On the other hand, is
C to be deprived of his rights by a private course of dealing between A and B? It was
decided in Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q.B.D. 102 (1879), that, in the case of the partiallydisclosed principal the fact of payment or settlement between A and B is immaterial. In
spite of such payment, C, when-he discovers A's identity, can sue him if he so prefers.
But in the case of the undisclosed principal, according to Armstrong v. Stokes, L.R. 7
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Q.B. 598 (1872), such payment is decisive and effectually prevents C from suing A.
The reasons for the distinction are plausible. In the case of the partially disclosed
principal, the third party, when he entered the contract, knew at least of the principal's
existence and relied to some extent upon his credit. The principal cannot, therefore, by
his own act, lessen this credit. But where the third party is ignorant of the very existence of a principal, no question of reliance upon his credit can arise and he is not unfairly damnified by arrangements between the principal and the agent.
The distinction and the reasoning given in its support are virtually adopted by sections 183 and 208 of the Restatement. The conclusion was perhaps inevitable, but may
still be regretted by an academic lawyer. The arguments are specious rather than
sound. The amount of credit given to the nebulous figure of the partially disclosed
principal cannot be satisfying to the business man, and the reasoning becomes almost
ludicrous when read in conjunction with the doctrine known in England as the Rule in
Schnltz v. Avery, 16 Q.B. 655 (i851). According to this doctrine, where a party contracts as agent for a principal whom he does not name, he may afterwards disclose the
fact that he has in reality no principal at all, but was acting for himself. The reasoning
offered by Mr. Justice Patteson in support of this conclusion is that "the defendant
cannot have been in any way prejudiced in respect to any supposed reliance on the
solvency of the freighter, since the freighter is admitted to have been unknown to him
and he did not think it necessary to enquire who he was." How is this position to be
reconciled with the arguments adduced to support the distinction between the Irvine
v. Watson and Armstrong v. Stokes cases? It would seem, if generally applicable, to
make the position of an undisclosed principal untenable. It is some slight matter for
regret that the draftsmen of the Restatement could not have expressed their conclusions in more guarded terms.

(3)
rJABy FoR RnAUi
Difficult questions have arisen in determining the liability in fraud of a principal
when the misrepresentations have been made by the agent in the course of his authority. According to the English authorities, four points are now dear. (a) If the principal instructs his agent to make the false statement, the principal is liable, though the
agent is innocent of deceit. (b) If the principal purposely employs an agent ignorant
of the truth in order that the latter may innocently make the false statement, the principal is similarly liable in fraud. (c)The principal cannot enforce or take the benefit of
a contract induced by the material misrepresentation of an agent, whether such misrepresentation be fraudulent or not and whether it be authorized or not. (d) The principal, though he may be personally innocent, will be liable for his agent's fraud, even if
this was perpetrated for the agent's benefit, provided that the principal placed him in
the position to accomplish the deceit. These rules are substantially embodied in sections 256-263 of the Restatement and the comments and illustrations contained therein. But there remains a doubtful point in English law on which the opinion of the
draftsmen of the Restatement is of interest. Is the principal liable in fraud for a statement known by him to be false, but made by his agent innocently and without his
knowledge or authority?
The'only English decision directly in point is the case of Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. and
W. 358 (1840). The facts in this case appear to have formed the model for the illustration set out on page 567 of the Restatement, and the decision of the court was that the
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principal could not be made liable in fraud, because "though he knew the fact, he was
not cognisant of the misrepresentation being made nor ever directed the agent to make
it." The decision, however, has not escaped criticism. Lord Halsbury in Pearsow v.
Dublin Corporation,[1907] A.C. 351, said, "If it was supposed to decide that the principal and agent could be so divided in responsibility that, like the schoolboy's game of
'I did not take it, I have not got it,' the united principal and agent might commit fraud
with impunity, it would be quite new to our jurisprudence. The case is not law if it is
supposed to affirm the proposition to which I have referred." The answer is that Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. and W. 358 (i84o), does not assume to affirm any such proposition.
The decision only emphasises the fact that there can be no fraud where there is no
evidence of the absence of honest belief in the person sought to be made liable. From
the wording of section 256 of the Restatement, coupled with that of the comment and
illustration on pages 566 and 567, American law would seem to accept the decision in
the Cornfoot v. Fowke case. It differs, however, from the English law in that it contemplates the possibility of an action for negligent misrepresentation, a doctrine rejected,
at least as a general proposition, by the English courts.

(4)

LIABILITY OF AGENTS TO TnMD PARTIES

Difficulties have arisen in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties when
an agent acts on behalf of a principal who labours under some legal incapacity which
prevents him from implementing the contract. According to the orthodox view of the
English law, the agent becomes personally liable on the transaction in the principal's
place, and the authority usually cited in support of this statement is Kelner v. Baxter,
L.R. 2 C.P. 174 (1866). The facts in this case were substantially those given in the
first illustration on page 722 of the Restatement. The defendant accepted the plaintiff's offer on behalf of a company not yet incorporated, and, in giving judgment
against the defendant, Chief Justice Erle said: "As there was no company in existence
at the time that the contract was made, the contract would be wholly inoperative unless it were held to be binding on the defendants personally." The company, when incorporated, could not ratify because of the rule that ratification is only permissible
when the party on whose behalf the agent ostensibly acted was in existence at the formation of the contract.
Section 326 of the Restatement seems substantially to accept the decision in Kelnter
v. Baxter, L.R. 2 C.P. 174 (1866). It is presumed that an agent "purporting to make a
contract with another for a principal whom both know to be non-existent or wholly
incompetent" is a party to the contract, though the presumption is not irrebuttable.
It is further stated in the comment to this section that "where a promoter makes a
contract in the name of an as yet nonexistent corporation, it is permissible to find
either that the promoter is intended to be a party or that an offer is being made which
may be accepted by the corporation after its birth."
The difficulties of accepting this view, however, are not negligible. Why should the
agent be made liable on the contract? It was never intended to be made with him, but
with the company which it was sought to promote, and to foist a liability upon him
simply because the original intention of the parties has failed seems perilously like an
inelegantiajuris.The difficulty was appreciated by Mr. justice Williams in the later
English case of Hollman v. .Pullin,i Cababe and Ellis 254 (Q.B. 1884). In that case the
plaintiff had contracted on behalf of an association which in fact had no legal capacity
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to contract as it had failed to comply with statutory requirements of registration. The
learned judge distinguished Kelner v. Baxter, L.R. 2 C.P. 174 (1866), on the ground
(supported, it may be added, only too scantily by the facts of the case) that the defendant might there be taken to have contracted personally in addition to the supposed liability of the company, and then proceeded to lay down the general rule in the following
words: "If an alleged agent professes to conclude a contract in the name and on behalf of an alleged principal and without using language expressing that he contracts
personally, no rule of law can convert his position into that of a contracting party, by
reason only of there not having been at the time any principal in existence who could
be bound."
The view thus expressed would seem at least to be more logical. One is tempted to
assert that the draftsmen in section 326 and the accompanying comment sought to beg
the question by making the issue a question of fact and adding a presumption in favour
of the agent's liability. It is not intended to deny the possibility, on the facts of any
particular case, of an acceptance by the agent of a personal liability in addition to his
position as agent, but, if a presumption were needed, it would surely have been better
to raise it in favour of, rather than in opposition to, the general principle of the law.
The whole question, however, is admittedly one of difficulty, and here, as elsewhere,
the draftsmen, pursuing their function of "stating clearly and precisely in the light of
the decisions the principles and rules of law," are too often faced with the Herculean
task of making order out of a mass of chaotic decisions. One English lawyer, at least,
concluded his examination of the present volumes with envy at their opportunity and
admiration for their achievement.
C. H. S. FiEOOT*
Bonds and Bondholders, Rights and Remedies, with Forms. By Silvester E. Quindry. Chicago: Burdette Smith Co., 1934. 2 Vols. Pp. 1381. $20.
Mr. Quindry is a member of the Chicago Bar and this book is apparently the result
of his practice in that city since the collapse of 1929. The bulk of Volume One is devoted to a discussion of the remedies of holders of defaulted corporate bonds. It is a
comprehensive survey of all of the remedies available to trustees, protective committees and majority bondholders; it should prove useful to minority bondholders seeking
a catalogue of the means of asserting their rights or of harassing the majority. Fortunately the corporate reorganization amendment to the Bankruptcy Act has now
been passed. The book is recommended to younger members of the Bar and to lawyers
not specializing in corporate practice as a convenient means of acquiring background
information and as suggesting remedies for consideration. For lawyers specializing in
the field it should prove a convenient guide to the authorities. Of particular interest is
the chapter on Liquidating Trusts-a vehicle for salvaging the investment of holders of
real estate bonds which has several advantages and which should come into more general use.
The book does not purport to be an authoritative treatment of the underlying legal
theories involved or of their historical development. It is designed for practicing lawyers rather than for law students or instructors.
The book will not be particularly useful to lawyers engaged in drafting papers for
* Fellow of Hartford College and Lecturer at Law at the University of Oxford.

